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The Persistence of the
Standardized Life Cycle
Mark Elchardus and Wendy Smits
ABSTRACT. This article investigates to what degree the standard-
ized life cycle has been replaced by an individualized life course,
characterized by the absence of a strict sequence and timing of life’s
transitions. In order to measure the normative position of people,
rather than the external conditions to which they are subject, the test
is based on the ideal life course or life cycle as described by a purely
random sample of 4666 inhabitants of Belgium, aged 18 to 36. The
available evidence overwhelmingly points towards the persistence of
a standardized ideal life cycle, characterized by a strict sequence and
timing of the important transitions. KEY WORDS • individualiza-
tion • life cycle • open future • sequence • timing
Conceptions of the life cycle or the life course as a natural phenomenon have
been largely replaced by the view that these temporal structures are a norma-
tively anchored, man-made phenomenon, that imposes regularity on life’s
events and life’s decisions, and thus affects the welfare and well-being of indi-
viduals and collectivities (Elchardus, 1984; Szinovacz and De Viney, 2001).
The social sciences have, however, developed a starkly dualistic view of the
properties of those structures. In much of the literature the opposing views of the
life cycle or the life course are temporalized, that is, they are linked to different
historical periods. The first of those can be labelled a period of strong standard-
ization and homogenization, resulting in what will be called here a standardized
life cycle. In contrast, the second period appears as a time of destandardization
and individualization, in which the standardized life cycle in fact becomes an
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individualized life course or a ‘choice biography’ (du Bois-Reymond, 1998),
resulting from individual, biographical decisions.
Two Views of the Life Cycle
The first period corresponds roughly to the industrial era, in which the struc-
turation of the life cycle is said to become characterized by the increasingly
strict sequence of education, work and retirement, or of the pre-active, active
and post-active life stages (O’Rand, 1995; Settersten and Mayer, 1997;
Scheepens, 1999; Marshall, 2001). The German sociologist Kohli described that
process as the triangulation of the life cycle (Kohli and Rein, 1991). The life
cycle of the industrial era is in fact considered by many authors as increasingly
standardized, with clear distinctions between and an unambiguous sequential
ordering of the different transitions and stages. That order is buttressed by law
(e.g. the age of obligatory schooling or legal retirement), by the regulation of
welfare provisions, such as access to pension systems (Breedveld, 1996;
Scheepens, 1999; Smolenaars, 1999) and culturally anchored in general concep-
tions of time (Leccardi, 2005).
According to several authors a second, and radically different phase in the
structuration (or rather destructuration) of the life cycle was initiated around the
1970s. The authors defending this position argue that the standardized life cycle
is then increasingly being replaced by a life course or an individualized choice
biography in which individuals take personal decisions concerning the timing
and sequence of important life course transitions (de Hart, 1992; du Bois-
Reymond and de Jong Gierveld, 1993; Peters et al., 1993; O’Rand, 1995;
Scheepens, 1999; Marshall, 2001). This means that the timing of those transi-
tions starts to show great variation (Liefbroer and Dykstra, 2000) and that 
the sequence of the transitions becomes less rigid. This results in the end of the
‘traditional, ordered sequence’ (Leccardi, 2005: 125), a development also
described as the ‘yo-yo-ization’ of the life cycle: students interrupt their studies
to work for a few years, people in the labour force temporarily return to school,
pensioners take up work again, people marry before finishing their studies and
so on (Liefbroer and de Jong Gierveld, 1993; Thomèse, 1995; Howard, 1998;
Scheepens, 1999; OECD, 2000; Barou and Rigaudiat, 1983; Hoge Raad voor
Werkgelegenheid, 2001). In short, the life cycle as a sequence of transitions and
stages is being replaced by a series of positions that are simultaneously access-
ible and between which individuals can increasingly hop.
Various empirical analyses have already pointed out that reversals of the
habitual sequence are in fact quite rare (Glorieux, 1985; Aymmard et al., 1996;
Breedveld, 1996; Douglas, 1997; Glorieux et al., 2004). Contrary to the expec-
tations raised by the destructuration thesis, the comparative survey of the
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Families and Transitions in Europe project came to the conclusion that ‘(i)n
exploring respondents’ future perspectives, it is interesting to observe the wide-
ly shared expectation of a linear transition, within which, one event follows
another in a predetermined order’ (Biggart et al., 2003: 5). Yet, events indicative
of a destructuration or individualization of the life cycle receive a lot of atten-
tion, often on the basis of qualitative research. This creates the impression that
they are frequent and indicative of fundamental shift from a standardized life
cycle to an individualized life course.
In this article we want to empirically gauge the extent to which this shift has
indeed taken place in the population under study. Instead of temporalizing the
two structures of the life cycle, we view them as two hypotheses about the way
the scheduling of important transitions is organized in contemporary society. In
order to clearly formulate those hypotheses, the concepts of life cycle, life
course, (de)structuration and individualization will be more systematically
defined in terms of temporal theory. This is done in the next section.
Elements of the Temporal Organization of Life
Life is not inherently temporal, but is temporalized because it is constrained by
organic, psychological, cultural and other internal or external environments. The
general characteristics of temporalization are twofold: first there has to be a 
difference between the relatively invariant and the relatively variant, second
there has to be a sequence (Elchardus, 1988). Any structure can be said to be
temporalized from the moment it allows for a distinction between relatively
invariant and more variant properties, and allows for the sequential ordering 
of events and properties. A temporalized structure can also be used as a time-
keeper. The sun dial, for instance, distinguishes between the relatively invariant
dial and the variant shadow and inscribes the sequence of hours in its dial.
The temporalization of life is commonly performed through the distinction of
stages, that are separated by transitions, and that are sequentially ordered (e.g.
leaving the parental home, taking up a job, getting married etc.). In the case that
a group is characterized by a common sequence of such stages, the stage a 
person is in can be used as a socially meaningful definition of age (e.g. the
‘adult’ is not the person who has attained the age of 18, but the person who left
the parental home and has taken up a job). As a result of an historical process of
rationalization and standardization of time (Thompson, 1967; Schöps, 1980;
Zerubavel, 1980) we do, however, commonly express the position on this 
temporal structure in terms of clock time or chronological age. The modern 
temporalization of life is therefore not only described in terms of stages, transi-
tions and the sequence of stages, but also in terms of the timing and the duration
of transitions and stages, or the chronological age at which the transitions take
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place. The fundamental, modern parameters of the temporalization of life are
therefore the distinction of stages, the sequence of stages, and the timing of the
transitions in and out of the stages.
In the light of these theoretical and conceptual clarifications it is possible to
systematize the thesis of destructuration, referred to in the previous section.
Theories of the life cycle situate the invariant in a cultural and institutionalized
structure, the standardized life cycle, and the variable in the different individual
lives shaped or oriented by that structure. The structure itself is constructed as a
timed sequence of transitions leading to different, sequentially ordered life
stages. It offers the individual a sequentially ordered view of his or her future
life.
Theories claiming the end of the standardized or, as it is often called, linear
life cycle, situate the invariant in the individual who is considered as an actor
making (strategic) choices and building a choice biography. The sequential
order is no longer the one fixed in the life cycle, but the result of the individual’s
choices among manifold possibilities. The stages are no longer sequentially
ordered, but simultaneously assessable positions. This is the reason why the 
thesis of the destandardization of the life cycle is closely linked to, is in fact a
specification of, the more general individualization thesis (du Bois-Reymond
and de Jong Gierveld, 1993; Peters et al., 1993; Furlong and Cartmel, 1997; du
Bois-Reymond, 1998; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). Viewed in this way,
the discussion about the existence of a standardized life cycle is, in fact, a 
discussion about the fundamental features of contemporary society and of that
society’s attitude with regard to time.
The empirical validity of the two positions, of course, hinges on the extent to
which there still is, within a given population, and despite diversity within that
population, agreement on the sequence of stages and the appropriate timing of
the transitions. Yet, various possibilities remain as to how to measure that agree-
ment.
It is obvious that both the life cycle and the life course can be described in
more or less detail. As the descriptions become more sensitive to detail, one
approaches an idiosyncratic life story for which even the format of a biography
might be too constraining, compared to that of the novel. In almost all of the
research about the life cycle, the transitions and stages focused on pertain to a
limited number of stages defined in terms of education, family life and labour
market status. The discussions about the standardization and destandardization
of the life cycle, referred to earlier, are all concerned with stages and transitions
defined in that specific way. We will follow that practice in this article.
A much more important question about the way in which agreement about the
sequence of stages and the timing of transitions should be measured concerns
the distinction between the internal and the external environments of action
(Alexander, 1983: 36–44). A constraint emanating from the external environ-
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ment would mean that external constraint or necessity force the individuals into
a specific temporal pattern. Internal constraints mean that a view of how life
should be conducted has been sufficiently internalized and/or institutionalized to
become meaningful, normative and desirable. An actual biography, like most
social phenomena, is a combination of both internal and external constraints.
Many authors have pointed out that the actual life course an individual follows
can and should be regarded as a compromise between that individual’s ideals
and norms on the one hand and the externally imposed conditions under which
he or she has to try to respect those norms and realize those ideals on the other
hand (Buchmann, 1989; Liefbroer and de Jong Gierveld, 1993; Hareven et al.,
1999). Therefore we insist that internal and external constraints should be 
analytically and empirically distinguished. The question whether the life cycle
still exists has to be phrased in terms of internal constraints: is there still, within
a given population, a consensus concerning a sequence of stages and a concep-
tion of the timing of transitions that is considered ideal? It is only when such a
cultural phenomenon has been established that the question can be raised
whether present-day conditions and constraints do force strong deviations from
that ideal pattern, to the extent that one might fear its erosion. If the destructura-
tion of the life cycle would be solely a matter of external constraint, it would be
inappropriate to relate it to changing conceptions of time, to a cultural process
like individualization or to new patterns of institutionalization. In fact, many of
the authors positing a destructuration of the life cycle explicitly link that 
development to a cultural or normative shift in the direction of greater individu-
alization and individualism, which expresses itself in the tendency of more
people to deviate from conventions, collectively held norms and traditions, and
to make more personal decisions (du Bois-Reymond and de Jong Gierveld,
1993; Peters et al., 1993; Furlong and Cartmel, 1997; du Bois-Reymond, 1998;
Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). For all these reasons a shift in the nature of
the structuration of life should be judged on the basis of the ideal or normative
conception of the life cycle, rather than on the basis of the (forced) adaptation to
(externally imposed) conditions. If the destructuration was only a matter of
forced deviation from an existing ideal form, then there would be no reason to
speak of a new conception of the life cycle. In this article we therefore primarily
address the question whether the life cycle still exists as an internal environment
of action. In the conclusions we shall, however, also address the question to
what extent the actual behaviour deviates from the ideal form.
In linking the theory to specific hypotheses and their operationalization, a last
question has to be addressed. The existence of a standardized life cycle has been
explained by different social theorists as a simplifying and coordinating device.
Talcott Parsons (1951) for instance, sought the rationale for temporal structures
in their functionality for coordination: they acted ‘so that different times are set
apart for different activities, with different people’ (p. 301). A similar argument
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is made by Niklas Luhmann (1976) who sees the life cycle as a mechanism of
simplification: because it fixes a sequence of stages, it tells the individual what
should come next and hence reduces the openness and complexity of the future.
Luhmann calls this ‘defuterizing the future’ (p. 141). These functionalist argu-
ments can of course not be taken to mean that the standardized life cycle should
exist (drawing such an implication would be a functionalist fallacy). Yet, they
do suggest that a weakening or a disappearance of a standardized life cycle will
be accompanied by a higher complexity of life and increased demands for
reflexivity and flexibility of the individuals. The thesis of individualization does
indeed posit a higher level of reflexivity in the individuals (Giddens, 1991). The
internal logic of its position does indeed seem to compel the theory of the
destructuration of the life cycle to posit a more reflexive individual, acting as a
strategic actor and making choices, as compared to a ‘traditional’ actor who
unthinkingly followed the standardized or linear life cycle. Biggart et al. (2003:
10) for instance, claim that very formal transition and trajectory models exist
side by side with individualization of the transitions, because the transitions
within the life cycle model are now guided by personal choice, while presum-
ably they were before not guided by personal choice. We think that this is an
empirically indefensible position. First, because there is no solid evidence about
how people before made their life cycle choices. Assuming them to be unthink-
ing cultural dopes seems too simplistic. Second, and more importantly, one
should make a very clear distinction between the justification used in explaining
choices on the one hand, the factors, internally or externally, constraining the
choices on the other. There is ample evidence that contemporary strategies of
justification tend to emphasize personal choice, rather than tradition or conven-
tion (Wood and Zurcher, 1988). While 100 years ago explaining one’s actions in
terms of duty, tradition and convention gave dignity, today an explanation in
terms of personal choice gives dignity. One should, however, not confuse such
rationalization or justification of action with the internal and external constraints
orienting the action. Therefore the thesis of the individualization of the life cycle
should not be based on the justification strategies actors use in talking about
their life course decisions, but on the observable results of those decisions.
Individualization only exists when the ideals of individuals start to show greater
individual variation with regard to the sequence of the stages and the timing of
the transitions.
Empirically Evaluating the Destructuration Thesis
As argued earlier, our point of departure, guiding the way we test the destruc-
turation thesis, is that the extent to which the transition from a standardized 
life cycle to an individualized life course has already taken place, should be
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measured on the basis of the ideal conception of the life course. Therefore the
respondents were asked, ‘What is for you the ideal age at which the following
events should take place?’ followed by a description of the different transitions
(the first sexual encounter, obtaining one’s driving licence, the right to vote, 
the first job experience, becoming financially independent, completing one’s
studies, cohabitating with a companion, marriage, birth of the first child, buying
a home, birth of the last child, pension or final labour market). The notion of
‘ideal’ was purposefully not specified, but linked to the personal opinion of the
respondent. Therefore it can refer to a personal preference as well as to a social
norm by which the respondent wants to abide. The primary purpose of phrasing
the question in that way was to avoid respondents referring to what they think
others consider appropriate or ideal, but would give their personal opinion of
what is desirable.
The analysis is based on a random sample of 4666 inhabitants of Belgium,
aged between 18 and 36. They were interviewed by way of a written question-
naire during the first months of 2004.1
One of the aims of the research was to see whether the reported ideals had 
the characteristics of collectively held and standardized norms or showed on the
contrary the variation one would expect to find in individualized choices. Five
criteria or tests will be used to judge which is the case or, phrased differently,
whether we should still speak about an ideal standardized life cycle or, rather,
acknowledge the existence of a normative and cultural shift towards an indi-
vidualized life course. 
1. A destandardization or individualization of the life cycle should result in
great variation around the mean ideal age of the different transitions;
2. It should result in ‘yo-yo-ization’ or in a weakening of the ideal sequential
order, in the sense that many individuals will advance different sequential
orders as ideal;
3. Individualization also implies that the ideal is adapted to the personal life 
situation and hence varies with, among other things, the age of the respon-
dent;
4. The extent to which an ideal standardized life cycle persists can also be
gauged from the way the life course adapts to prolonged, post-secondary edu-
cation. If this feature of the life course is adapted to by loosening the
sequence and/or by increasing the variation around the ages of transition,
then this can be interpreted as a sign of individualization. If it is adapted to
homeostatically, by respecting the sequence and by simply postponing tran-
sitions subsequent to the end of formal education, then a strong argument for
the persistence of an ideal standardized life cycle can be made;
5. If the life cycle is individualized, the number of transitions completed should
have no or weak effects on the extent to which people consider a change of
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the future life course possible and/or probable. If future life possibilities are
seriously narrowed as more transitions are completed, then this means that
those transitions are considered irreversible or difficult to reverse, which
would make returning in the sequence more difficult. With this test one 
can indeed see to what extent the stages are no longer considered stages,
foreclosing future possibilities, but simultaneously accessible positions.
The variation of the ideal timing of transitions
The ideal timing of transition is presented in Table 1. There is, in the population
under study, a rather strong consensus concerning the ideal ages at which the
various transitions should take place. Of the 12 variation coefficients, 10 are
smaller than .20. This means that the standard deviation is 2/10ths of the 
average, which is considered small. Only the ideal age of two transitions shows
a somewhat greater variance: the age at which the right to vote is obtained and
the age deemed ideal to stop studying. The largest of them is still smaller than
1/3rd of the mean.
TABLE 1
Ideal Age
Standard Coefficient of 
N 25% 50% 75% Mean Deviation variation (σ/x)
First sexual intercourse 4422 16.0 17.0 18.0 17.53 2.23 0.13
Driving licence 4525 18.0 18.0 19.0 18.59 2.45 0.13
Voting age 4425 18.0 18.0 20.0 19.21 5.33 0.28
First work experience 4471 18.0 20.0 23.0 20.32 3.61 0.18
Financial autonomy 4445 20.0 22.0 24.0 22.20 3.62 0.16
End of studies 4404 20.0 22.0 24.0 22.52 5.55 0.25
Cohabitation 4418 22.0 24.0 25.0 23.66 3.28 0.14
Marriage 4297 25.0 25.0 28.0 26.40 5.03 0.19
First child 4478 25.0 26.0 28.0 26.41 3.21 0.12
Purchase of a house 4465 25.0 27.0 30.0 27.60 4.24 0.15
Last child 4433 30.0 35.0 35.0 34.15 4.48 0.13
Retirement 4477 55.0 59.0 60.0 57.73 5.31 0.09
Another way of looking at the variation in the timing of transitions is offered
by the interquartiles. The difference between the age younger than anybody
deems ideal and the age which everybody considers too old for the transition
concerned, is rather sudden, as Figure 1 indicates. The ages at which the transi-
tion should have taken place according to 25 per cent of the respondents and the
ages at which it should already have taken place according to 75 per cent of the
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respondents, are also given in Table 1. A large difference between those ages
would indicate destandardization and individualization, a small difference indi-
cates the persistence of a standardized ideal or norm. The differences increase as
the transition is situated later in life. For the acquisition of a home, the birth of
the last child and retirement, it is five years. For transitions that occur early in
life it is one to two years. On average for all transitions it is 3.6 years.
While the literature about the destandardization or individualization of the life
cycle does not formulate precise, let alone quantitative, criteria to judge the
extent of those processes, both the variation coefficients and interquartiles com-
parisons suggest that the ideal life cycle is still characterized by a quite strictly
standardized timing of important transitions. As far as the timing of transitions
is concerned, there are, in other words, no serious indications of a destandard-
ization.
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FIGURE 1
The ideal life course
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First child
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Last child
The ideal sequence
The ideal averages and modal ages do follow a sequential order, but from that
observation one can of course not conclude that the majority of the respondents
consider that sequence as ideal. An appropriate way to verify whether the latter
is in fact the case is offered by the cumulative Mokken Scale (Mokken and
Lewis, 1982). When the different transitions do form such a scale, one can con-
clude that they form a real sequence for the population concerned, in the sense
that people with a different sequence form a small and statistically negligible
minority. The results of the test2 indicate that the different transitions do form a
strong and reliable Mokken Scale, indicating that in the population under study
there is a strong consensus concerning the sequence of these transitions. This
persistence of a clear and unambiguous sequential ordering of the transitions
obviously, and strongly, contradicts the thesis of destandardization.
The ideal life cycle seen at different ages
If a destandardization or individualization of the life course has occurred, then,
one would expect that the view of the ideal ages is adapted to the personal situ-
ation and especially to the passage of time or chronological age. If individuals
no longer adhere to a collectively held view of the life cycle, they should 
certainly adapt their personal view of that cycle to their own circumstances, par-
ticularly their age. In that case one would expect rather strong relationships
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TABLE 2
Correlation between chronological age and ideal transition age
Pearson’s correlation coefficient between 
chronological age and ideal age
Last child 0.202 (p = 0.000)
First work experience 0.096 (p = 0.000)
First sexual intercourse 0.085 (p = 0000)
Purchase of a house 0.066 (p = 0.000)
End of studies 0.043 (p = 0.005)
First child 0.042 (p = 0.005)
Cohabitation 0.042 (p = 0.005)
Voting age 0.040 (p = 0.008)
Marriage 0.035 (p = 0.023)
Driving licence –0.031 (p = 0.039)
Financial autonomy –0.049 (p = 0.001)
Retirement –0.074 (p = 0.000)
between chronological age and the age advanced as ideal for the different 
transitions. As Figure 2 indicates, this is absolutely not the case. For almost all
transitions the ideal ages form a well nigh horizontal line when plotted against
the chronological age of the respondents, which indicates very weak relation-
ships between the ideal age advanced for various transitions and the chrono-
logical age of the respondent.
There is one possible exception to this general picture: the age appropriate for
the birth of the last child (the age up to which children can be born) turned out
to be related, albeit rather weakly, to the chronological age (r = 0.20; see Table
2). As they grow older (and postpone child bearing), people somewhat advance
the age they deem appropriate for procreation.
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FIGURE 2
Relationship between ideal age and chronological age
Chronological age
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Since the plotted relationships appear linear, it is appropriate to use the corre-
lations coefficients to judge the strength of the relationship (see Table 2). With
the already noted exception of the birth of the last child, all correlations are very
small, indicating negligible relationships. All coefficients are smaller than 0.10,
and 7 out of the 12 smaller than 0.05. They are statistically significant, but that
is due in large part to the large sample size (N = 4666).
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TABLE 3
Age at which 25, 50 and 75 per cent of the respondents consider a certain 
transition as ideal to level of education
Only primary education 
or less
25 % 16 18 18 18 18 18 20 23 24 25 30 55
50 % 17 18 18 19 20 20 22 25 25 25 35 58
75 % 18 19 20 21 22 22 25 29 28 30 36 60
Secondary vocational 
and technical
25 % 16 18 18 18 20 20 21 24 25 25 30 55
50 % 17 18 18 20 21 21 23 25 25 25 35 57
75 % 18 18 20 21 23 23 25 28 28 30 35 60
Secondary general
25 % 16 18 18 18 20 21 22 25 25 25 31 55
50 % 18 18 18 21 22 22 24 25 26 28 35 56
75 % 18 19 20 23 24 24 25 30 29 30 36 60
Post-secondary, 
technical college
25 % 16 18 18 18 21 22 23 25 25 25 32 55
50 % 18 18 18 21 23 23 24 26 27 28 35 60
75 % 18 19 20 23 25 24 25 28 29 30 36 60
University
25 % 17 18 18 20 23 23 23 25 26 27 33 55
50 % 18 18 18 23 24 24 25 27 28 30 35 60
75 % 18 19 18 24 25 25 25 30 30 30 36 65
TOTAL (50%) 17 18 18 20 22 22 24 25 26 27 35 59
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The ideal life cycle is not only characterized by a consensus concerning the
sequence and by a relatively sharp timing, that timing is moreover strongly
invariant with regard to chronological age, which again contradict the
destandardization thesis.
The adaptation of the ideal life cycle to post-secondary education
It is obvious that the ideal life cycle will be affected by post-secondary educa-
tion and must in some way differ between, on the one hand the people who stop
studying before or after the completion of secondary schooling and, on the other,
those who pursue tertiary education. The way in which this adaptation takes
place can shed light on the extent to which the life cycle is destandardized or
individualized. Indeed, people pursuing tertiary education are likely to feel the
cross-pressures generated by the existing ideal life cycle on the one hand, and
the expectation to successfully pursue their studies on the other. It is conceivable
that they adapt by destandardizing the life cycle, frequently deviating from the
ideal sequence or even inversing the sequence, and by showing greater variation
in the timing of transition than the rest of the population. In that sense they could
act as a kind of avant-garde of the destandardization of the life cycle. Some
authors do indeed expect them to fulfil that role (Kuijsten, 1999; Dykstra, 2003).
It is, however, also conceivable that they respect the ideal sequence, do not
show more variation in timing than the rest of the population, and adapt to their
situation by simply postponing those transitions that are subsequent to the com-
pletion of their studies. The latter would be a minimal or homeostatic adaptation,
leaving the existing pattern (the ideal life cycle) as unchanged as possible. If that
turns out to be the case, it would be a very strong argument in favour of the 
persistence of the standardized life cycle.
Table 3 shows that the ideal sequence is almost completely invariant with
regard to level of education. Prolonged education does not change the sequence.
Deviations from the ideal sequence are in fact quite rare. When they occur, they
concern the sequence between marriage and having the first child. The ideal life
cycle (see Table 1) indicates that (unmarried) cohabitation is now regarded as a
stage in the life cycle that should precede marriage and procreation by about
three years. Marriage, home ownership and child bearing are now situated 
close together in time. In the ideal life cycle uncovered here, they occur almost
simultaneously. Child bearing is regarded by many as the reason for marriage
and marriage as the consolidation of cohabitation, making it fit for procreation.
People under 28 years of age situate marriage immediately before child bearing;
people over 28 tend to see the birth of the first child as ideally preceding 
marriage.
Even more surprising than the invariance of the sequence with regard to level
of education is that the variance of the ideal timing of the transitions is in fact
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TABLE 4
Ideal age – coefficient of variation to level of education
Only primary Secondary Post-secondary
education technical and Secondary technical
or less vocational general college University
x σ cv* x σ cv x σ cv x σ cv x σ cv
First child 25.3 3.6 0.14 25.9 3.1 0.12 26.8 2.9 0.11 27.0 3.0 0.11 27.6 3.1 0.11
Last child 34.2 5.7 0.17 33.5 4.5 0.13 34.6 4.4 0.13 34.4 4.1 0.12 35.1 3.5 0.10
Purchase of a house 26.9 4.8 0.18 26.8 4.1 0.15 28.1 4.6 0.17 28.0 3.7 0.13 29.2 4.0 0.14
Marriage 26.0 6.1 0.24 25.8 4.3 0.17 26.9 6.7 0.25 26.9 5.1 0.19 27.4 4.5 0.16
Cohabition 22.7 3.3 0.15 23.3 3.8 0.16 23.7 2.7 0.12 24.1 2.5 0.11 24.5 2.5 0.10
End of studies 21.0 4.3 0.20 21.5 4.9 0.23 22.6 2.5 0.11 23.4 5.3 0.23 24.9 8.1 0.32
Financial autonomy 21.2 4.0 0.19 21.4 4.2 0.19 22.1 2.8 0.13 23.0 3.0 0.13 23.8 2.1 0.09
First sexual intercourse 17.5 2.3 0.13 17.4 2.7 0.16 17.7 1.8 0.10 17.6 1.6 0.09 17.7 1.8 0.10
Retirement 57.2 5.8 0.10 57.0 5.4 0.09 57.4 4.5 0.08 57.9 5.1 0.09 59.8 5.0 0.08
First work experience 19.6 3.2 0.16 19.4 3.3 0.17 20.8 4.1 0.20 21.0 3.6 0.17 21.9 3.7 0.17
Driving licence 18.7 2.1 0.11 18.6 2.9 0.16 18.7 3.8 0.20 18.6 1.7 0.09 18.5 1.1 0.06
Voting age 19.9 7.3 0.37 19.4 6.0 0.31 19.5 6.3 0.32 19.1 4.1 0.22 18.4 1.5 0.08
* cv = coefficient of variation.
smaller for the people with post-secondary schooling than for the others. Table
4 indicates that the coefficient of variation is smaller for most of the transitions.
The only exception is the ideal age of ending the studies. Concerning this 
transition, the group of higher educated young adults is more heterogeneous
than the less educated people.
People with secondary schooling adapt the ideal life cycle to their situation by
simply advancing the ideal age for those transitions that are immediately linked
to their prolonged education or subsequent to the completion of education in the
ideal life cycle. The ideal age to finish studies is situated at 21 years (median
age) by people not pursuing post-secondary education and at 25 years by people
pursuing higher education. The ideal age for transitions preceding education is
the same for both groups, with a slight difference for the right to vote: people
who pursued university studies see 18 (the actual voting age) to 19 as ideal.
Many of the young adults with less schooling are convinced that more maturity
is needed to vote and situate the ideal age for voting around 20 years of age. The
ideal age for transitions subsequent to education, such as becoming financially
independent, cohabitating, marriage, father- or motherhood, home ownership
and retirement, is situated later, in all cases four to five years later, with the
exception of retirement which is situated three years later.
These observations strongly contradict the thesis of destandardization and
individualization and highlight the extent to which the ideal, standardized life
cycle constrains the ways in which people placed in a situation in which they are
forced to deviate, adapt with a minimum of deviation.
The life cycle and the open future
The thesis of a destandardized life cycle in which the stages do become positions
that are simultaneously and no longer sequentially accessible is closely related
to and, in fact, premised on, the idea that contemporary individuals avoid conse-
quential engagements or make their engagements easily reversible (Adriaansen
and Zijderveld, 1981; Lipovetsky, 1983; Brose, 1988). It is obvious that a
greater reversibility of engagements (in work, family, parenthood etc.) is a
necessary condition for the weakening of the sequential order of the life cycle
and a way of keeping the future open despite engagements already taken or 
transitions already completed.
The extent to which people believe that they still enjoy an open future and that
everything is still possible in their lives is measured on the basis of a question
with four answering possibilities. Table 5 gives the answers together with the
average and median age of the group agreeing with each item, as well as the
average number of the transitions already completed by each group. The transi-
tions counted here are those listed in the description of the ideal life cycle, minus
retirement and with divorce/separation added.
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It is obvious that as (chronological) age advances or more transitions are 
completed, people experience a progressive closure of their future. In fact when
the effects of age and the number of completed transitions are simultaneously
controlled for, it turns out that it is the latter that influences the attitude with
regard to the open future. Its influence can clearly be seen in Figure 3. The pro-
portion of people claiming that in their life nothing is decided yet and all options
are open, declines from more that 50 per cent for people who have not yet com-
pleted one transition, to 0 per cent for people who have completed nine transi-
tions. The proportion claiming that it has become well nigh impossible to
change their life, goes from 0 per cent when no transitions are completed to
more that 20 per cent when nine transitions are completed.
All this shows that many people consider the different transitions as conse-
quential engagements that progressively close the future and in that way also
buttress a sequential order of the stages of the life cycle. Yet, despite the strong
effect of the number of completed transitions (and indirectly of chronological
318 TIME & SOCIETY 15(2/3)
TABLE 5
Relationship between attitude with regard to the open future, 
chronological and social age
Chronological age Mean number
of transitions
% Mean Median (social age 0–9)
• Nothing is decided 30.8% 25.7 25 2.62
yet in my life, all 
options are still open
• Despite everything I have 46.1% 28.1 28 4.05
already done, I think that 
I can still give a 
different direction to my 
life if I wished to do so
• I think it is difficult to still 20.3% 30.2 32 5.45
change my life significantly
• I think it has become well 2.9% 30.9 32 6.15
nigh impossible to change 
my life
TOTAL 100% 27.8 3.83
P 0.00 0.00
η2 9.4 15.6
age) the respondents in general believe in an open future. Even after nine transi-
tions about a third of the respondents still think that they could change their lives
and give them a different direction, if they would really want to. Maybe it is this
belief in the openness of the future, rather than the effect of transitions on that
belief, which has led some authors to conclude erroneously that transitions were
judged to be increasingly reversible.
The claim that the effect of transitions on the openness of the future is declin-
ing is, of course, much more difficult to verify than the hypothesis that the life
cycle is destandardized. Fortunately the same question about the open future
was asked in a survey of 1988 (Elchardus and Heyvaert, 1990), so that at least
change from 1988 to 2004, over a period of 16 years, can be mapped (see Table
6).
From Table 6 it is clear that the changes are minimal in the population under
consideration (21 to 36 years old). Yet, there is a very slight increase in the
openness of the future, which is statistically significant at the .05 level, but not
at stricter levels.
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FIGURE 3
Relationship between number of transitions already completed (social age) and
attitude with regard to the open future
Nothing is decided yet in my life, all options are still open
Despite everything I have already done, I think that I can still give a different direction to my life if I wished to do so
I think it is difficult to still change my life significantly
I think it has become well nigh impossible to change my life✕
Attitude with regard to the open future
Conclusion
All of the tests performed lead to the conclusion that the thesis of the individu-
alization of the life course should be rejected. There might be a modest evolu-
tion in that direction, but there are no compelling arguments to assume that this
evolution will continue or be irreversible. Looking at the situation today, it is
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TABLE 6
Percentage of 21- to 36-year-old people who have chosen the following answer 
possibilities in 1988 and in 2004 (row %) (N = 4555)
Despite everything
I have already
Nothing is done, I think that I think it is I think it has 
decided yet in I can still give a difficult to become well
my life, all different direction still change nigh impossible
options are to my life if I my life to change my
still open wished to do so significantly life
TOR88 (n = 505) 29.9% 42.2% 24.2% 3.8%
Life course 2004 
(n = 4050) 30.9% 46.6% 19.8% 2.8%
TOTAL 30.8% 46.1% 20.3% 2.9%
Note. χ2 = 7.82; df = 3; p = 0.05.
TABLE 7
Observed and real age for the completion of a number of transitions
Transitions Ideal age Observed age % of research 
population completed
End of studies 22.2 20.4 81.0
First work experience 20.2 20.7 80.7
Financial autonomy/
Leaving parents’ home* 21.7** 22.0*** 64.2***
Cohabitation 23.0 23.1 46.4
Marriage 24.9 24.2 36.4
First child 25.3 25.5 36.3
Purchase of home 26.3 26.0 39.5
* We asked about the ideal age of financial autonomy, not the ideal age of leaving the parental home;
we asked about the real age of leaving the parental home, not the real age of financial autonomy.
** Financial autonomy.
*** Leaving the parental home.
clear that an ideal life course still exists, which is characterized by an un-
ambiguous sequential order and a surprisingly strict timing of the transitions.
Life is ordered on the basis of a chronologically rather rigid, ideal temporal
structure. New developments do not lead to a destructuration of the life cycle but
to adaptations. Cohabitation now precedes marriage by a couple of years, leav-
ing the parents’ home comes after the first work experience. Even a potentially
very disturbing event, like prolonged education, is accommodated within this
life cycle by minimal, homeostatic adaptation: the postponement of transitions
posterior to the completion of education. As people complete more of the
sequentially ordered transitions of this life cycle, they have the impression that
their future progressively closes, which indicates that they do not consider the
transitions as (easily) reversible. Certainly when they are taken into account
simultaneously, those different observations strongly contradict the thesis of a
destandardization of the life cycle and of the emergence of an individualized life
course.
This still leaves open the possibility that a linear, sequentially ordered and
quite strictly timed ideal life cycle persists, while conditions force young people
to increasingly deviate from such ideal. In that case it would certainly not be 
correct to link the factual fading of the life cycle to cultural or value shifts or
individualization, but one could under such conditions expect the ideals to 
eventually adapt to the frequently forced deviations. Yet, such a development
does seem very plausible since a major challenge to the standardized life cycle,
the prolonged education and the very different life situations of people with low
and high levels of education, turned out to be homeostatically adapted to. Our
data are not meant to study the actual development of the life cycle. That would
require cohort analysis. Yet, taking into account the limitations of our data in
this respect, we shall compare the timing and sequence of realized transitions to
the ideals. One should take into account that in our sample the people that 
have already completed a transition are those that do so at a relatively early age,
compared to those that have not yet completed the transition.
For transitions that have been completed by at least about 40 per cent of the
respondents, Table 7 gives the real and ideal ages. With the exception of the age
at which the respondents stop going to school or university, the observed and
ideal average ages do almost perfectly correspond. It is clear that in the popula-
tion under study there is an educational deficit: the ideal age up to which people
want to study lies on average about two years higher than the actual age.
When one looks at the age at the different transition, not in terms of averages
but in terms of the relationship between the individually observed ideal and the
real ages for seven transitions, the correlation equals .42. That the completion 
of transitions rather strictly follows a timing based on chronological age, also
appears form the correlation coefficient of no less than 0.77 between the chrono-
logical age and the number of transitions that have already been completed.
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Yo-yo-ing or the occupation of a combination of stages that appears incon-
gruent in terms of the observed ideal sequence is also relatively rare. Cohabita-
tion while still studying is observed in 10 per cent of the respondents;
cohabitation before the first work experience in 7.5 per cent. Living in the
parental home and already having a child occurs in 1.9 per cent of the cases.
Even studying while having a job is relatively rare in the population under study,
and only observed in 8.1 per cent of the respondents. While there is some 
disagreement, at the level of the ideal, as to whether home ownership should
precede parenthood or come after it, the combination of having a child without
being home owners only occurs in 17.6 per cent of the cases.
Within the limits of our data, that is, for the respondents that have already
completed a number of transitions, there is a very close correspondence between
the ideal and the observed. The numbers occupying incongruent stages are
small, sometimes surprisingly small in the light of the extensive provisions and
special programmes that are offered by many universities to promote study
while working or that are made through the social security system and time 
credit systems, in order to promote a return to school for adults.
The linear or traditional life cycle appears to be very solidly established as an
ideal in the population studied here, and, in as far as our data allow such a judge-
ment, deviations from that ideal appear limited.
The thesis of the destructuration or individualization of the life cycle seems in
fact so far removed from reality that one can but raise the question of why it is
so popular and so readily believed. The answer can conceivably be sought in the
kind of research methodology that is often used when advancing it. As stated in
the introduction to this article, the thesis is often temporalized and argued on the
basis of the contrast between the strong standardizing tendencies of the industri-
al era and the destandardizing tendencies that presumably set it in the 1970s. By
phrasing the question in that way, one has to rely on historical comparisons and
hence on research evidence that does not allow to make the crucial distinctions
between the internal and external environments of action or between an ideal or
normative level of action on the one hand, and the adaptation to circumstances
on the other. Yet the inherently cultural notion of individualization presupposes
just such a distinction. Moreover, the arguments in favour of the destandardiza-
tion thesis are often based on qualitative evidence, highlighting cases the 
striking character of which is then mistaken for statistical significance or 
immediately and without solid reasons assumed to illustrate a strong trend or
tendency. Qualitative research is also sensitive to the discourses of justification
used by the respondents. Contemporary discourses are likely to emphasize 
individual choice, rather than institutional or cultural constraints.
Yet, we believe that the reasons for the popularity of the individualization 
thesis might be more profound and closely linked up with dominant or hege-
monic cultural frames of reference of the modern era. These also explain why
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signs of a shift towards destandardization are immediately interpreted as a trend
characteristic of the dynamics of modernity. An important aspect of those
frames of reference is the belief in an open future. Luhmann (1976) has persua-
sively argued that the belief in an open future is a feature of the modern histori-
cal consciousness. It can be applied to history, as well as to the life course. Yet,
for history as well as the personal life course one should be careful to make the
distinction between the way in which these phenomena are viewed and the way
in which they are structured. A belief in the openness of history does not neces-
sarily change historical regularities or increase the degree to which social
change can be engineered, just as the belief in an open life need not trivialize the
commitments connected to life’s transitions. The belief in the open future seems
to be one of the ways in which modern men and women keep alive the possi-
bility of boundless individual choice and opportunity, in the face of life’s 
strictures. A large part of the social science approach of the life cycle seems to
have been an attempt to buttress that belief in the open future and to describe
crucial institutions, such as the life cycle, as if they were adapting to that belief.
The tendency to do so can have been stimulated by a mechanism Simmel
(1903/1989) and later Adorno (1967) highlighted long ago. Simmel was con-
vinced that cities reduced the chances for individualism because they tended to
standardize subjectivity, through what he called ‘objectified culture’. That,
according to Simmel, was the reason why fierce individualists like Nietzsche
tended to hate the city, but also why city dwellers loved thinkers like Nietzsche
precisely because their extreme individualism spoke to their frustrated desires
and aspirations for subjective autonomy, exacerbated by a shrinking space to
realize them. A similar thesis is advanced by Theodor Adorno, commenting on
Veblen. The chances for individualization become smaller due to the impact of
standardized consumption, and as they do so, the realization of individualism or
the belief in personal autonomy and choice are sought in even greater participa-
tion in consumption. In the same way we would suggest that while the life cycle
stays strongly standardized, some parts of social science fulfil the task of 
squaring that fact with the aspiration for an open future, backing the belief that
we are escaping from the standardization of the life cycle, exchanging standard-
ized life for a strongly individualized life course.
Notes
1. The questionnaire was mailed to a pure random sample of 10,000 inhabitants aged 18
to 36, according to the method of Total Quality Control. Forty-seven per cent of the
sample returned a completely filled-in questionnaire. This sample was weighted for
age and level of education. The coefficients used for weighting varied between 0.56
and 2.8..
2. The analysis was performed using MSPWIN5.0 (Mokken Scale analysis for
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Polytomous Items) (Molenaar and Sijtsma, 2000). To examine if the 11 transitions are
cumulative, we calculate for each age the Loevinger’s coefficient for homogenity H,
which is an indication of the scalability of the transitions. These coefficients are cal-
culated on basis of the number of errors. An error is a deviation of the assumed
sequence. With 0.39 < Hij < 0.64 we can speak of a strong hierarchy. The P-coeffi-
cient, which is a measure of internal consistency, has values between 0.47 and 0.88.
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